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THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
MORTGAGES BY DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS
I.
The English doctrine [that an equitable mortgage may be
created by depositing the title deed to land with a creditor
has been recognized, either by decision or by dictum, in this
country, to some extent. In 'the earlier cases in New York'
and South Carolira,2 states which had a separate chancery
jurisdiction and which early adopted the doctrines of the
English court of chancery, the English doctrine apparently
was adopted at first; but in the later case of Parker v. Bank '
there is no doubt as to -the position of South Carolina in re-
spect to the doctrine. It was held that "a mere parol de-
posit of title deeds as a security for debt" does not create an
equitable mortgage on land as it would be incompatible with
the registry laws. In Sleeth v. Sampson I Judge Cardozo
indicates that the status of ithe doctrine in New York is
quite uncertain. He says: "To what extent, if at all, this
form of equitable mortgage is permitted in New York, is
involved in some obscurity."
However in Ebling Brewing Ca. v. Geunario I Blackmar,
J., speaking for the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court, Second Department, had this to say: "The
1 Rockwell v. Hobby, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 9 (1844) (a son had paid his
mother's mortgage and retained an unrecorded deed to her as security; held, son
had an equitable mortgage on the premises for the amount of his advance with
interest).
By way of a criticism of this case, it is said that the case loses force from the
further holding that the son was subrogated to the rights of -the mortgagee whom
he had paid. See: Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 55 Neb. 243, 251, 75 N. W.
569, 572, 44 L. R. A. 387, 70 A. S. R. 381 (1898).
2 Hutzler Bros. v. Phillips, 26 S. C. 136 (1886) (deposit of title deeds to en-
able an attorney to prepare a legal mortgage in accordance with an oral agree-
ment to that effect; held not to create an equitable mortgage. While the Court
purported to follow the English authorities, it was not aware of the conflict of
those authorities on this point).
8 53 S. C. 583 at pp. 595, 596 (1898).
4 237 N. Y. 69, 74, 142 N. E. 355, 30 A. L. R. 1400 (1923).
5 189 App. Div. (N. Y.) 782, 785 (1919).
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text writers state that the doctrine of equitable mortgage by
deposit of title deeds is not usually accepted in the United
States. Among the states that reject the doctrine New York
is not named, apparently on account of Rockwell v. Hobby
(2 Sandf. Ch. 10). That case cannot be held to be authority
that the doctrine is adopted in this State. The case was con-
sidered in Bowers v. Johnson (49 N. Y. 432), and, it seems
to me, disapproved. In Stoddard v. Hart (23 N. Y. 556)
Comstock, Ch. J., said: 'In this State the doctrine is almost
unknown, because we have no practice of creating liens in
this manner.' I think it may be said with accuracy that the
doctrine is entirely unknown in this State." Probably such a
transaction would be recognized and enforced, in this juris-
diction, in cases where it would be inequitable to refuse re-
lief to the depositee, where he has performed.6 The New
York Statute of Frauds is suggestive. It is therein provided: 7
"Nothing in this title contained, shall be construed to abridge
the powers of courts of equity, to compel specific perform-
ance of agreements, in cases of part performance of such
agreements." Some latitude is thus left for the exercise of
the powers of a court of equity.
In New Jersey the English doctrine appears to have a
fairly firm foothold. In Griffin v. Griffin I the complain-
ant sued to compel the defendant to surrender to her deeds
to complainant's ancestor of land in New York. The deeds
had been deposited as security. The Court, relying on
New York authorities as governing and as indicating that
such a deposit operated in that State as a mortgage, refused
to decree their surrender until the complainant offered to
do equity by paying the debt for which the deeds were
pledged. In Gale's Executors v. Morris' the Court said
that an equitable mortgage may be "created by a deposit
of title-deeds," citing Griffin v. Griffin, and Brewer v.
6 See suggestion in Stoddard v. Hart, 23 N. Y. 556, 561 (1861).
7 3 N. Y. Rev. St. (1875) c. 7, tit. 1, § 10.
8 "18 N. J. Eq. 104 (1866).
9 29 N. J. Eq. 222 (1878).
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Marshall'" (a case where the doctrine was not involved).
In the more recent case of Bullowa v. Orgo " a different
matter is involved. It was there held that the deposit of
title deeds in pledge for the payment of -a debt until a legal
mortgage should be executed, under an oral agreement,
constituted an equitable mortgage; the Court relied chiefly
on English authorities.
In Alabama, 2 Mississippi,"3 Missouri,' 4 and Tennessee,"'
the English doctrine has been rejected as being contrary
to the Statute of Frauds in each of these states. In
Iowa, 6 Ohio,' 7 South Carolina,' 8 and Vermont, 9 the doc-
trine is rejected as being incompatible with the recording
or registry laws. In the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon, ° Kentucky,2' Minnesota,2 2 Nebraska,2 and
Pennsylvania, .4 'the doctrine is rejected for both reasons.
10 19 N. J. Eq. 537 (1868).
11 57 N. J. Eq. 428 (1898).
12 Lehmann, Durr & Co. v. Collins, 69 Ala. 127 (1881), dictum, that the doc-
trine is contrary to the Statute of Frauds.
13 Gothard v. Flynn, 25 Miss. 58 (1852), held, that deposit of deed with
surety, accompanied by an oral agreement that he have a lien on the land, did
not create an equitable mortgage, as the rquirements of the Statute of Frauds were
not met. See, also: Williams v. Stratton, 10 S. & M. (Miss.) 418 (1848), where it
was said that, "Such a mortgage is in direct opposition to the Statute of Frauds..."
14 Hackett v. Watts, 138 Mo. 502, 515 (1897), dictum, "The owner of the
fee can not create a lien upon the land by simply depositing his deed as security
for money borrowed because such a contract would come within the provisions
of -the Statute of Frauds .... "
15 Meador v. Meador, 3 Heisk. 562 (1871), dictum, that the doctrine does
not prevail in Tennessee, as it would be contrary to the Statute of Frauds. But
it appears from the Court's reasoning that .there was only an intent to give a lien
on the deed deposited
16 In re Snyder, 138 Iowa 553, 114 N. W. 615, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 206 (1908).
17 Probasco v. Brooks Johnson, 2 Disn. (Ohio) 96 (1858) (deposit of title
deed to certain land "sought to be subjected," accompanied by an oral agreement
"that it was thereby intended a lien should be created," held not an equitable
mortgage, as it would be contrary to the spirit of the registry act.
18 Parker v. Bank, 53 S. C. 583, 595, 596 (1898), held, that "a mere parol
deposit of title deeds as a security for debt" does not create an equitable mort-
gage as it would be contrary to the registry laws.
19 Bicknell v. Bicknell, 31 Vt. 498 (1859), dictum, that the doctrine has no
place under our registry system.
20 Grames v. Consolidated Timber Co., 215 Fed. 785 (1914), deposit of final
homestead certificate as security for past and present advances; held, not an
equitable mortgage on the homestead, as it would be contrary to the registry sys-
tem and the Statute of Frauds.
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Two reasons would seem -to have impelled an adoption of
the English doctrine in this country. The English Statute
of Frauds and Perjuries of 1677 is the prototype of many
an American Statute of Frauds; and many states have stat-
utes providing for the adoption of -the English common law
in so far as it is applicable and not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution of the United States or the organic law of the re-
spective states. But the American courts have profited by
the conscious realization by Lord Eldon and other English
judges that the English doctrine -is not only the plainest
violation of the purpose and policy of the Statute of Frauds,
but also is pernicious. In commenting on the rule stare
decisis et non quieta movere, in this connection, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota said 25 that while it regarded this rule
as of quite as much importance as any in the administration
of justice, it thought that ". . . whenever a question is pre-
sented for the first time, and we become satisfied that the
courts of England, or in any of the States, have adhered to a
rule which they confess to be erroneous, simply because they
are bound by precedents of their own making, it is our duty,
as well as our privilege, without violating any rule of de-
cision, to adopt the view most consonant with reason and
principle...."
On the other hand, the High Court of Errors and Appeals
of Mississippi was not willing to go upon authority and dis-
cussed the doctrine from the standpoint of principle. It
said that the mere act of deposit of 'the deeds did not satisfy
21 Vaumeter v. McFaddin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 435 (1848), dictum, that the
adoption of the English doctrine would be contrary to the Statute of Frauds and
the recording acts.
22 Gardner v. McClure, 6 Minn. 250 (1861), dictum, that the English doc-
trine is contrary to the Statute of Frauds and the registry system.
23 Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 55 Neb. 243 (1898), held that the English
doctrine is contrary to the Statute of Frauds and the registry system.
This decision contains a discussion of the earlier Federal case of First Nat.
Bank v. Caldwell, Fed. Cas. No. 4,798 (Cir. Ct., D. Neb., 1876).
24 Shitz v. Dieffenbach, 3 Pa. St. 233 (1846) (Deposit of unrecorded deed
with surety as a security; held, not to create an equitable mortgage as it would
be contrary to the Statute of Frauds and registry acts.)
25 In re Gardner v. McClure, 6 Minn. 250, 263 (1861).
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-the evidential requirements of the Statute of Frauds; it was
not an unequivocal act, sufficiently noteworthy to take the
case out of the operation of the statute.26
The strongest reason against the adoption of the Eng-
lish doctrine in this country is the registry system. The
purpose of this system is to afford security to titles by a pub-
tic record which parties dealing with 'the land may, and for
their own protection must, examine, and on which they may
rely. Secret transfers and liens are sought thereby to be
prevented. A mortgage by deposit of title deeds tends to
defeat this purpose. The recording acts have another bear-
ing on the question. In England title deeds followed the
land. The evidence of title lay not only in the delivery of a
deed, but in its continued possession by the grantee. When,
therefore, the owner parted with his muniments of title he
parted with the means of disposing of the land. When the
deposit was by way of pledge, the pledgee, by his manual
possession of the deeds, had the effective power to prevent
an untoward disposition of the land. But under our system
it is not usual to consult or even to inquire about the original
conveyances. They have performed their chief offices when
they have been recorded. Thenceforth the record becomes
the practical evidence of title.
While the doctrine of equitable mortgage by 'the deposit
of title deeds has been discussed in this country, as a matter
of principle, chiefly with respect to a local Statute of Frauds
and recording or registry act, -there has been some discussion
of the doctrine in reference to a deposit as security for ante-
cedent indebtedness. In Sleeth v. Sampson Judge Cardozo
said:2 7 "The danger [involved in the doctrine] is emphasized
in this case where the bulk of the indebtedness was ante-
cedent to the promise." In Hutzler Bros. v. Phillips 21 it was
said: "It appears... that in England, and also in several of
26 Gothard v. Flynn, 25 Miss. 58 (1852).
27 237 N. Y. 69, 74, 142 N. E. 355, 30 A. L. R. 1400 (1923).
28 26 S. C. 136, 147 (1886).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the States, that where the title deeds are actually deposited
by the debtor with his creditor upon an advance of money,
and perhaps even for an antecedent debt, as a security, that
an equitable mortgage will arise without more ... "
A more positive assertion appears in Probasco v. Johnson2"
that "In England, however, and in New York, as well as in
Mississippi, where the equitable right is said to be thus
created, it exists only when an advance is made, upon the
faith of the deposit, never to secure a precedent debt, or to
create a trust by which a lien would enure to prior creditors."
In the English case of Mountford v. Scott 30 Lord Eldon
held that the deposit would not, by implication, include
antecedent debts. Rit would seem to require a clear inten-
tion to that effect to be manifested before even the Eng-
lish courts would recognize that the deposit secured previous
advances. The tenor of the cases is to this effect."
II.
The doctrine of equitable mortgage by deposit of title
deeds is said to be hostile to the recording acts in this coun-
try. In a sense, this is true. Under our recording or regis-
try laws, the mere possession of the title deeds is of no real
significance, necessarily, to the owner of the real estate;
the records of recorded deeds or certified copies thereof may
take their place. The "practice is to record instruments af-
fecting real estate, and the law, generally, provides for mak-
ing such records, and certified copies thereof, evidence." 2
"Owners look to the record as furnishing the real evidence of
title, 'and as exhibiting the true condition of all interests in
and claims upon the land which could affect the right of pur-
chasers or incumbrancers; and to the records all parties go,
as a maitter of course, even in preference to the original
29 2 Disn. (Ohio) 96, 100 (1858).
30 37 Eng. Rep. 1105 (1823).
31 2 Powell on Mortgages, 6th ed., 1057a.
32 Jennings v. Augir, 215 Fed. 658, 660 (1914).
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deeds. In fact, no presumption or inference would, in gen-
eral, be raised from the mere possession of title deeds by a
stranger." '3
But in another sense, we might inquire as to whether such
a mortgage is necessarily repugnant to our registry laws.
Is there any reason why actual notice of an equitable mort-
gage arising upon a mere deposit of title deeds should not
be the equivalent of actual notice of a prior unrecorded mort-
gage? One object of the registry laws is to give notice of
the state of the title to subsequent purchasers or incum-
brancers. From this viewpoint, these acts would be violated
when the enforcement of the equitable mortgage by deposit
would result in subordination of a person who had relied on
the record title without actual notice of the equitable mort-
gage. But when the true state of the title is actually made
known to the subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer regard-
less of any record being made, wherein would the registry
laws be violated, either the spirit or letter, by subordinat-
ing him to such a prior equitable mortgage? The more
persuasive cases in this connection are those in which there
has been a deposit of a title deed with the creditor, accom-
panied by an oral agreement that the deed is delivered to
the latter as a mortgage upon the depositor's interest in the
land to secure a debt or obligation. The authorities are
apparently divided on the question as to whether the de-
positee secures an equitable mortgage thereby. In Jennings
v. Augir 34 E gave R a deed to an undivided moiety of cer-
tain lands, which deed R did not record. R delivered this
deed to E, taking back from E a written memorandum,
signed by E and stating that the deed was delivered as a
mortgage or lien upon R's interest in the land to secure cer-
tain indebtedness. In an action by the trustee in bankruptcy
of R, brought against E to recover an undivided half inter-
est in -the lands, the Court held that the transaction con-
33 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed.) § 1265.
34 Jennings v. Augir, 215 Fed. 658, 660 (1914).
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stituted a valid equitable mortgage. After discussing the
basis of the English doctrine, the Court said: "As long as the
deed is unrecorded, and, without fraud on the part of the
grantor, returned by him to the grantee - thus putting it in
his power to destroy the same, and thereby greatly jeopard-
izing any evidence of rights thereunder, if not rendering it
impossible for the grantee to establish his title - while the
rule requiring the best evidence obtains, it appears clear
that the reasoning upon which the English cases have been
decided would apply and control." The Statute of Frauds
was not pleaded against the mortgage, and so the Court dis-
cussed the situation with respect to the registry laws. The
result reached seems to be sound. E would seem to have an
effective power to prevent an untoward disposition of the
land, such as would defraud him, just as he would have had
under the English system. This would be true whether the
grantee in the unrecorded deed delivered it to the grantor
as security or delivered it to another creditor as security.
In Gardner v. McClure " R delivered an unrecorded deed
of certain premises to E as secutity for a debt, giving E, at
the same time, a memorandum (unsigned) stating that E
was to hold the deed as security. Subsequently, R gave E-2
a mortgage on the premises; E-2 had notice of E's claim be-
fore the former obtained his mortgage. On demurrer to
the complaint of E setting forth the foregoing facts and
asking inter alia, that the mortgage of E-2 be declared a
subsequent lien to that of E and asking for a decree of fore-
closure and sale of the ,premises, it was held that the de-
posit of the deed and the accompanying writing did not cre-
ate any interest in the land in the favor of the depositee,
the writing not being sufficient to take the case out of the
operation of the Statute of Frauds, and the doctrine of equi-
table mortgages by deposit of title deeds being considered as
contrary to 'the policy of the registry laws. The Court pur-
ported to condemn ,the doctrine absolutely as being an "an-
35 6 Minn. 250 (1861).
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tiquated heresy," and as being contrary to sound commercial
principles. But the facts of the case hardly justified such a
far-reaching effort on the part of Justice Flandrau, who de-
livered the opinion. There was no intention to create an
interest or estate in the lands; R only intended to give a
lien upon the deed itself, and the Court might well have
stopped here. Even the English authorities would not have
held -that E obtained an equitable mortgage on the land,
contrary to the intent of the parties. Therefore, it was a
sound conclusion that E obtained no security interest in the
land itself; his only security was a lien on the deed. If E-2
had had no actual notice of E's claim, the fact that there
were-no deeds in the possession of R or on record might be
held sufficient notice to put E-2 on inquiry. Few purchas-
ers would take title under such circumstances.
There is something -to be said in favor of a policy that is
opposed to any laxity in recording instruments that affect
the title to real estate, since there are those other than pur-
chasers or incumbrancers who probably rely on record titles
as a basis for granting credit. It would certainly have some
bearing on the financial rating of 'the record owner of prop-
erty. The policy of the registry law promotes certainty and
tends to prevent the efforts to encumber land with secret
liens. There is little, if any, occasion for such lax methods
of doing business to-day. It can hardly be said that busi-
ness men, or the practice of making loans generally, would
sanction the doctrine of equitable mortgage by deposit of
title deeds.
III.
In the great majority of the cases in this country that
have considered the doctrine of equitable mortgage by de-
posit of title deeds, there has been involved only the ques-
tion of whether the deposit gave rise to an equitable mort-
gage on the real estate comprised within the deeds. Many
cases involve an oral agreement, accompanying the deposit,
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that the depositee either have a lien on the documents or on
the land comprised within them. Where, however, the de-
posit is accompanied by an oral agreement to execute a legal
mortgage, there are two possible situations: (a) The de-
posit may be by way of a present security until the legal
mortgage is executed; or (b) it may be merely a preliminary
step to the preparation of a mortgage which will be security
thereafter. In regard to these two situations, the depositee
may present .his claim for relief on one or the other of three
possible theories: (a) He may simply claim that the de-
posit constitutes an equitable mortgage. If so, one court,
at least, has asserted that the deposit must have been made
for the purpose of creating a present or immediate security
in order to entitle depositee to the benefit of an equitable
mortgage. "6 Or (b) he may claim that there has been a suf-
ficient part performance, with attending circumstances, to
make a case of fraud, against which a court of equity ought
.to relieve. Or (c) he may base his claim to relief simply on
ihe ground of part performance. If the plaintiff bases his
claim to relief on the ground of part performance, then he
must rely on acts which frequently are, and must be, equiv-
ocal, and he will generally be denied relief, if the Statute of
Frauds is relied on as a defense. Such a lien may be said
to arise by operation of law, the creation of which the Statute
of Frauds does not prohibit.38
From the standpoint of authority, some of the leading
cases will be considered. In Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan
County Bank " one Underwood held a contract of purchase
from the L. Company of certain real estate upon which
there remained a balance due. He obtained a loan of $900
from the Harlan County Bank for the purpose of paying
this balance, and for the purpose of discharging certain ob-
36 Hutzler Bros. v. Phillips, 26 S. C. 136 (1886).
37 See: Williston on Contracts, § 494.
38 Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank, 71 Kan. 158, 161, 162, 80
Pac. 49, 114 A. S. R. 470, 6 A. C. 44 (1905).
39 Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank, 71 Kan. 158, 161, 162, 80
Pac. 49, 114 A. S. R. 470, 6 A. C. 44 (1905).
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ligations he had incurred for improvements on this land.
When the loan was made, he left his land contract with
the Bank, and authorized it to procure a deed of the property
from the L. Company; at the same time, he orally agreed
with the Bank that it should hold -the land contract, and
afterward the deed, as security until a formal written mort-
gage could be prepared, which he agreed to give. The Bank
paid the L. Company, obtained the deed, and paid the ob-
ligations for improvements. Underwood then refused -to
execute the formal mortgage .to the Bank, and mortgaged
the property to the Foster Lumber Company, which Com-
pany had actual notice of the equities of the Bank. The
Bank sued to recover the balance due upon its loan and
claimed a lien on the land superior .to that of the Lumber
Company. In sustaining the Bank's claim that it had a
lien on the land and -that -this lien had priority over the mort-
gage of the Lumber Company, the Supreme Court of Kansas
said:
"The bank .. pleaded and proved .. .that the deposit
of the contract of sale was accompanied by an express oral
agreement to give a mortgage. The agreement furnished a
sufficient basis upon which, after performance by the bank,
to found a lien, and is sufficient to take the case entirely
out of the category of equitable mortgages arising from a
deposit of title deeds... The fact that the transaction may
have included an attempt to create a lien by the deposit of
title instruments does not alter or destroy the effect of the
promise to give a mortgage. The bank's theory, in part,
may have been that the deposit of the contract and the pro-
curing of the deed.., did give it a lien. The two claims are
not inconsistent. Both have been urged... Having obtained
the bank's money upon an agreement to give it a mortgage,
Underwood should have executed and delivered the prom-
ised security. Equity treats that as done which a party un-
der his agreement ought to have done... The fact that the
agreement -to give a mortgage was oral does not affect the
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validity of the bank's lien. It had fully performed its part
of the agreement.. . 'courts of equity. . . decree the specific
execution of agreements where there has been a performance
on the one side, because the refusal to perform on the other
side is a fraud; and they will not permit the statute designed
to prevent fraud to be made an engine of fraud.'... Besides,
it properly may be said that the lien decreed results from
the operation of the law upon the entire conduct of the
parties, and hence is in its terms excluded from the inhibi-
tion of the statute. 'It is claimed by counsel ...that an
equitable lien on real estate . . . cannot be created merely
by parol; that the statute of frauds . ..proMbits such a
thing. All of this we agree to; but still the statute of frauds
does not attempt to prohibit the creation of equitable liens
by operation of law, nor does any other statute ... Such a
lien should of course be -in accordance with the contract and
understanding of the parties affected by it, but still it may
sometimes result by operation of law from the transactions
of the parties almost wholly independent of the contract
that may be made between them.' . . . notice to the lumber
company of the bank's rights was equivalent to notice of a
prior unrecorded mortgage. Under the recording acts such in-
struments are valid between the parties and (as to) all per-
sons having actual notice of them."
The court did not consider whether or not the deposit of
the land contract with the Bank and the obtaining of the
deed by the Bank created an equitable mortgage, and it ex-
pressly refused to consider the policy of the State towards
such an equitable mortgage. It proceeded rather on the
theory that -the oral agreement to give a legal mortgage,
accompanying the deposit, plus performance by the Bank
(complete performance by transferring the $900), gave the
Bank a right to a lien on the land, and the judgment of the
trial court awarding the Bank a lien on the land was af-
firmed. This lien, or property right, was held to be superior
to that of a subsequent 1ienor with actual notice thereof.
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Since the lien was awarded to -the Bank, it looks like it took
effect by operation of law, whether arising pursuant to the
contract or not, and a decree of "specific execution" of the
contract would be unnecessary and unimportant.
The theory of the Kansas Court -that where there has been
a performance of an agreement on the one side, refusal -to
perform on the other side is a fraud, and that a court of
equity will decree specific execution of the agreement in
such a case, is very interesting. There was no evidence of
actual fraud in -the case. Apparently, Underwood intended
to perform his promise when he made it. In most cases,
where a promise has been made in good faith and is sub-
sequently broken, the refusal to perform does not give rise
to a cause of action, either for deceit or for equitable relief,40
whether the equitable relief is positive or by way of recission
and restitution.
The Kansas Court merely referred to and relied upon one
theory underlying the recording statutes, namely, that re-
cording operates to give constructive notice, and when, as
in the case, a subsequent mortgagee or grantee of the prem-
ises has actual notice of a prior interest in the premises
based upon an unrecorded recordable instrument, the fact
that the latter instrument is not recorded is immaterial.
Clearly, this brief reference to the recording statute con-
tains nothing that would show that an equitable mortgage
by deposit of title instruments would not be recognized and
enforced in Kansas. Everything said in the opinion is con-
sistent with recognition of such a mortgage. We are not
informed as to why Underwood's refusal to execute a legal
mortgage induced the action of the Bank; it had possession
of the land contract and subsequently the deed. How Un-
derwood could create -any subsequent interest in the premises
is not explained by the Court. It seems that the Bank had
ample protection in its possession of these instruments.
40 Prosser on Torts, 764, 765.
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The leading case -on the theory of part performance is
Sleeth v. Sampson,4 the opinion in which was rendered by
the late Justice Cardozo. The action was brought to en-
force specific performance of an oral agreement to execute
a mortgage upon certain land as security for a loan advanced
at the time the oral agreement was made in 1921; that time
the debtor handed to the creditor a deed under which the
premises had been conveyed ,to the debtor in 1904 and an
abstract of title saying: "You look these over, and see what
you can do, and we will go down to the lawyer's in a few
days and draw this up." Nothing more was done or said.
The debtor died within less than a month thereafter. The
judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint was
affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. Justice Car-
dozo said:
"An estate or interest in real property (other than a lease
for a term not exceeding one year) cannot be created, grant-
ed, or assigned 'unless by an act or operation of law, or by
a deed or conveyance in writing.' Real Property Law (Con-
sol. Laws, chap. 50), § 242. A contract 'for the sale of any
real property, or an interest therein,' is void unless the con-
tract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the
consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the grantor. Real
Property Law, § 259. A mortgage -is a conveyance of an in-
terest in real property within the meaning of § 242. A con-
tract to give a mortgage is a contract for the sale of an in-
terest in real property within the meaning of § 259."
Having thus established that the creation of a mortgage
of real estate requires a writing, within the meaning of the
State statute, and that a contract to give a mortgage of real
estate is within the State Statute of Frauds, the Court then
proceeded to consider whether there had been acts of part
performance sufficient to relieve from the necessity of pro-
duction of a writing, saying:
41 237 N.Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355, 30 A. L. R. 1400 (1923).
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"To be thus effective, they (acts of part performance)
must be of such a nature as to be 'unintelligible or at least
extraordinary,' unless related to a contract to convey an
interest in land... The payment of money is not enough,
unless followed by other acts, as, for example, possession
or improvement ... The deficiency in the acts of part per-
formance is supplied, it is said, by delivery of title deeds
and abstract. Equitable mortgages by the deposit of titfi
deeds have long 'been recognized in England, though the
security is frowned upon as contravening the policy of the
statute of frauds ... To what extent, if at all, this form of
equitable mortgage is permitted in New York is involved
in some obscurity . . . Even in England, however, the de-
posit must have been* made for 'the purpose of creating A
present or immediate security, and not merely as a prelimi-
nary step to the preparation of a mortgage which will be
security thereafter . . . We find no suggestion here of the
existence of a purpose to create a present lien... At best,
the case is within the rule that acts merely ancillary or pre-
liminary to performance are not acts of part performance
within the equitable doctrine."
According to this reasoning, it is difficult to understand
just how a mortgagee would ever partly perform so as to
relieve from the production of a writing. The New York
Civil Practice Act, § 991, expressly denies to the mortgagee
the right to maintain an action to recover the mortgaged
premises. But the mortgagee may obtain possession by
consent of the mortgagor, or by a decree in foreclosure.42
Even if the mortgagee obtained possession of the premises
with consent of the mortgagor, he would rarely, if ever, be
interested in making improvement, at least, to the extent
that a vendee would be so interested. The only part per-
formance in New York that would normally be made by a
mortgagee would be making a part of the loan or extending
42 See: Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 84 N. E. 75, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.)
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a part of the credit promised to the mortgagor. In the
principal case the evidence did not show how much of the
promised loan was made by the mortgagee; if he advanced
all of the loan, there would be complete performance hy
him. In the second place, the Court seems to indicate that
the mortgagee may rely upon the acts of the mortgagor in
handing over the deed and abstract as a part performance.
Generally, a party relying upon acts of part performance
must rely upon his own acts, not those of the other party to
the contract." The making of the loan, or the advancing
of credit, by the mortgagee would hardly be "unintelligible
or at least extraordinary," unless related to a contract to
mortgage; such acts could refer to an unsecured loan just
as readily, using the Court's test of sufficiency of acts of
part performance. The Kansas Supreme Court, as we have
seen, has adopted the view that the advancement of the
loan by the mortgagee is a complete performance of all acts
normadly expectable on his part." Professor Walsh says
that "the fundamental difficulty with the argument of the
Court in Sleeth v. Sampson is in the failure to recognize
that a purely executory contract to make a loan and give a
mortgage will not be specifically enforced in favor of either
party as the remedy at law is adequate, while an executory
contract to sell land will be so enforced." " With this posi-
tion, the writer disagrees. A money judgment would hardly
be adequate for a creditor who has contracted for a mort-
gage security, any more so than in case of a purchaser who
has paid part of the purchase price but has failed to get a
conveyance. While good business practice would frown
upon such "looseness" by the creditor, the immediate de-
mands of the debtor might require haste; if so, why should
he be permitted to shield himself behind the Statute of
Frauds as against an accommodating friend? Any question
43 58 C. J. p. 993.
44 Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank, 71 Kan. 158, 161, 162, 80
Pac. 49, 114 A. S. R. 470, 6 A. C. 44 (1905).
45 Walsh on Mortgages, 48, N. 30.
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as to a creditor obtaining a preference or as to perjury could
readily be disposed of by any court.
The statement of the facts by the New York Court of
Appeals, in Sleeth v. Sampson, does not show whether or
not the deed that was deposited with the creditor had been
recorded prior to the deposit. If it had been thus recorded
the record title would have been in the debtor, and the deed
itself, for most, if not all, practical purposes, would have
been of no value; a certified copy of the record copy would
serve as well as the original. On the other hand, if the deed
was not recorded at the time of the deposit, the creditor
would have been in the same advantageous position as the
creditor in the Foster Lumber Co. case.
The leading case in this country adopting and applying
the doctrine that a mere deposit of title deeds with the cred-
itor to be held as a security for a present loan, or advance-
ment of credit, or to secure the incurring of an obligation
(for instance, as surety), .is Bullowa v. Orgo.46 In this case
the Bullowa firm had employed Orgo as agent to sell their
goods and collect payment therefor. To secure faithful per-
'formance of this contract by Orgo, one Bilancia deposited
the title of deed for his house with the Bullowa firm to be
held as security for any defalcation by Orgo until Bilancia
should execute a formal mortgage on the house. Later,
Bilancia refused to execute the formal mortgage and de-
manded a return of the title deed. The Bullowa firm sued
for an accounting from Orgo and to have the house declared
subject to a lien for the amount found due from Orgo to the
firm. The court overruled the demurrers to the bill. The
bill was said to be one 'to foreclose an equitable mortgage.
One point raised by the demurrers was that the deposit did
not create an equitable mortgage because the debt for which
the deed was deposited as security was the debt of a third
person and not that of Bilancia. But the Court held that
46 57 N. J. Eq. 428, 41 AtI. 494 (1898).
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an equitable mortgage could be created in this manner, say-
ing:
"I am unable to assent to the doctrine that an equitable
mortgage, by depositing title deeds, may not be created in
order to secure the debt of a third person. The authorities
are not so. It was faintly argued by the demurrants that
the deposit of title deeds, with an agreement to execute a
legal mortgage, did not constitute an equitable mortgage.
But the authorities are the other way."
The facts in this case do not show whether or not the deeds
had been recorded prior to the deposit. There was a distinct
agreement that the deed be held as security until a legal
mortgage could be executed on the date agreed upon. The
Court made no analysis of the doctrine, and did not consider
the objections to its application in this country. The au-
thorities cited are four English cases, an early New York
case, and Jones on Mortgages. The opinion is not a very
important one in favor of approval of the equitable mort-
gage by deposit of title deeds except for the fact of mere
express sanction.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Sleet v. Sampson,
said that a contract to give a mortgage on land is within the
Statute of Frauds and is void unless the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration,
is in writing, and subscribed by the mortgagor. In In re
Snyder 4 a deed of Des Moines, Iowa realty was deposited
as security for a suretyship undertaking; the deposit was
accompanied by an informal writing stating that the "in-
closed papers" (the deed and some promissory notes) were
deposited as security against any loss by reason of the surety-
ship obligation, and describing the property as the "Des
Moines property, which is pledged" to the surety. In hold-
ing that an equitable mortgage on the land was thereby
created, the Iowa Court said:
47 In re Snyder, 138 Iowa 553, 114 N. W. 615, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 206 (1908).
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"While the instrument is informal its purpose is mani-
fest, and there is no reason for not enforcing the lien in-
tended thereby to be created. No particular formality is
necessary to make a valid mortgage between the parties
thereto . . . 'If the transaction resdlves itself into security,
whatever may be its form, it is in equity a mortgage.'"
This statement was not made in discussing the Iowa
Statute of Frauds. Whether this writing was a sufficient
memorandum under the statute, we are not informed.
Neither are we informed as to whether or not this writing
was recordable, under the Iowa recording statute. In a
prior part of the opinion, the Iowa Court expressly disap-
proved of the doctrine of equitable mortgages 'by deposit
of title deeds with creditors, as running counter to the State
system of registry. If public policy is opposed to the one
transaction, under this State's registry system, why is it not
equally -opposed to the other?
IV.
The conditions which led to the recognition, in England,
of the doctrine of equitable mortgage by the deposit of title
deeds are entirely wanting in this country. The basis of
fact which exists in England is not found in our law or prac-
tice. The doctrine is not in harmony with our system of
recording and our methods of conveyancing. In several of
the states, where the doctrine has been judicially considered,
it has been repudiated. A few states purport to recognize
the English doctrine; but there is no settled course of ju-
dicial decision to this effect and it can hardly be said -that
the doctrine is firmly established in these states.
Where the deposit of title deeds is by way of a present
security and is accompanied by a parol agreement to exe-
cute a legal mortgage, which agreement is not performed,
and the depositee brings an action for specific performance,
on the theory that the agreement has been partly performed,
or fully performed, by making part or all of the promised
loan, the better view would seem to be that the same rule
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should apply as applies in case of an action for specific per-
formance of a contract to convey land.
A deposit of a title deed with the creditor as security for
an indebtedness, whether accompanied by an express parol
agreement, should mean something and create some right
both at law and in equity. It is a valid pledge of the deeds
themselves, valid as between the parties, and would give
ample security if the deed has not been recorded. It is simi-
lar to a solicitor's lien. The depositor cannot recover the
deeds at law until he pays the debt; neither can he recover
the deeds in equity until he does equity by discharging the
obligation which the deeds were intended to secure. But
Pomeroy would go one step further, and regard, in equity,
the pledge of the deeds as creating a lien on the land. Such
a result, he says, would be carrying out the evident intention
of the parties, and would be in complete harmony with our
system of recording and of conveyancing. On the other
hand, as respects third persons, such as purchasers or in-
cumbrancers, even those who deal with the land embraced
Within the deeds with actual notice of the deposit, such a
lien should not be recognized at all.4" This distinction goes
too far. There is no policy in favor of protecting a subse-
quent vendee or mortgagee of the premises where he has
actual notice of the depositee's asserted interest in the land
involved. There is no recording statute in this country that
denies effect to all transactions the evidence of which is em-
bodied in nonrecordable instruments. A defensive lien on
the deed deposited might not be a sufficient security; the
debtor might need prompting. Recognizing a lien on the
land would overcome this objection to limiting the de-
positee's rights to a defensive lien. There seems to be one
objection. There are those who, it might be said, occasion-
ally rely on record titles as a basis for granting credit; the
financial rating of the depositor would probably be affected
by secret Hens. W. D. Rollison.
48 See: 3 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence (3d ed.) § 1266.
